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he phenomenal success of the Tactical Advancements for 
the Next Generation (TANG) Forum held last year has 
ignited a revolution in the naval forces. Perhaps we are 
nearing Malcolm Gladwell’s tipping point in our quest fundamen-
tally to alter how we design and operate our submarines. Vice 
Admiral Richardson happily announced after the event that some 
of the ideas for our sonar and fire control systems were so 
outstanding that they would be incorporated into the next technical 
insertion, slated for introduction to the fleet in 2014. Only a scant 
two months after the TANG Forum, “working prototypes have 
been built and are running with at-sea data.”1 Despite the 
resounding success of the forum, the Submarine Force faces a 
significant challenge in encouraging and exploiting this fledgling 
culture of innovation. Reaching the tipping point will require the 
Submarine Force to create a system where all sailors have the 
ability to freely share their ideas for improvements to their 
systems—not just the combat systems. In doing so, not only will 
we benefit from the power and experiences of our junior sailors 
and officers, but we will begin to foster a new sense of ownership 
and pride that will propel us to the forefront of the naval service.  
  
Small Problems that Elude Big Navy 
While the TANG Forum focused on the next-generation 
combat systems, we can extend the idea of innovation to our 
current boats and their systems and achieve Vice Admiral 
Richardson’s goal of returning our Force to a build-test-build 
mentality. I know from my own experience, and those of many of 
the sailors that I served with, that there are small changes that 
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would make their job significantly easier, or at least less 
frustrating, if we had a way to make them known and imple-
mented.  
The Voyage Management System (VMS) makes a perfect case 
study. In my last few patrols, both of our VMS computers would 
take an eternity to do the simplest of tasks: load a voyage plan, pan 
the map, zoom out, bring up the Targets window, etc. On more 
than one occasion, one of them would simply crash, requiring a 
significant time investment to restart them and load the current 
voyage plan with all of its settings. On some days, we were even 
more unlucky and both would crash nearly simultaneously—
thankfully we weren’t a certified for electronic navigation boat 
yet! Most sailors I spoke with as an officer of the deck when VMS 
would crash intuitively knew that the computer running the 
program simply needed more RAM to smoothly run this 
processor-intensive program. A whole new computer would have 
been even better.  
Under the current model, it would take a long time, a year or 
more, perhaps, to get the drawings and contracts changed to allow 
us to install a few RAM chips and make our lives easier. The 
cheaper and easier solution: let us take ownership of our boats and 
execute the build-test-build model on a micro scale. I propose that 
we can solve the VMS problem in the following manner, which 
will be analogous to any other minor change that a sailor wants to 
propose. First, Navigation division reports a potential solution to 
the Navigator; we want to install RAM in VM1 to see if it 
improves performance. Second, the Navigator orders a message 
drafted outlining their proposal, the cost to complete the change 
with open source parts, and the testing they will perform to verify 
the change. Third, the message is sent to the type commander, 
among other recipients, who reviews it, consults with the in-
service engineering agent (ISEA) for the system in question, and 
gives concurrence to the boat to make the alteration. Fourth, the 
ship completes the alteration and testing and reports the results 
back to the type commander. If successful, the change can be 
promulgated to the rest of the Submarine Force for implementa-
tion while the ISEA works to update the system schematics, parts 





lists, etc. What would normally take a long time can now be done 
in a matter of days or weeks.  
VMS is only one example. As a watch officer, I probably 
heard a hundred such ideas in my three years onboard. These were 
ideas that allowed us to make our jobs more efficient, provide 
better data flow, or improve watch team communications, but 
since the systems in question were not within our realm to change, 
they died with the end of the watch.  
 
Details and Caveats 
The generalized model described in the preceding section 
requires boundaries and caveats in order to be realistic and 
successful.  
• Changes to programs of record, such as systems owned by 
Naval Reactors or the Strategic Systems Program, for exam-
ple, would be off-limits for obvious reasons. Ideas for these 
systems should still be sent, not as a proposal for an immedi-
ate change, but as a means to keep the innovation going.  
• Proposed changes must be reversible so that the designed 
system effectiveness can be restored should the alteration fail 
or prove less efficient.  
• Proposed changes should be small enough to implement with 
open source, commercial off the shelf equipment that the boat 
can procure within its existing budget. Many boats do this 
already with the placement of additional computer monitors in 
control, for example. 
• Recipients should not be limited to the normal addressees for 
messages to the type commander. Messages should also be 
sent directly to the top as well. While the type commander can 
make approvals for these alterations, tracking of proposals 
should be done within the staff of Commander, Naval Subma-
rine Forces for trending, data analysis, and integration into 
future TANG workshops. Multiple proposals affecting the 
same system can provide the impetus to undertake a more 
rapid fix to a problem, which best can be accomplished from 
the top.  
 





Returning the Boat to Her Crew 
As a division officer, I felt more driven than most of my peers 
to keep my boat and crew at the best level of combat readiness that 
I could. That drive came from the subconscious knowledge that 
my boat, even a ballistic missile submarine, was still a warship. 
Keeping our boat in the best possible condition meant improving 
the quality of the work we provided to the fleet, and by extension, 
our survival.  
I had a variety of experiences with our maintenance facility 
and local submarine support center, but, increasingly I found that I 
had less control to effect changes to my boat because of current 
contracts—things we used to be able to do ourselves in the past. 
Giving sailors an easy outlet to make their ideas known for 
changes would return a sense of ownership to the crew by giving 
them a say in the quality of their at-sea home. Seeing the changes 
implemented and their lives improved because of their ideas 
would do even more. It would inspire our junior sailors and 
officers to leverage their previous experiences and think critically 
about the systems that they operate and how they can do their jobs 
better. These are the sailors and officers who are the next 
generation of Submarine Force leaders. Engaging them and 
empowering them to innovate will yield dividends now and in the 
future, with earned interest. Encouraging our present leaders to 
facilitate this innovation keeps with the highest principles of the 
Design for Undersea Warfare. The result can only be a better, 
more effective Submarine Force that embodies the characteristics 
of our predecessors who creatively carried the fight to the 
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